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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH CHARLES JENSEN and
BESSY T. JENSEN,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
DAVIS COUNTY, a body politic
of the State of Utah,

Case No. 930180-CA

Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
1. Appellants filed their appeal in the Supreme Court of
Utah. Thereafter, the Supreme Court under date of March 25, 1993,
directed that the case be transferred to the Court of Appeals for
disposition. Appellants appeal from the judgment entered in their
favor granting Appellants damages and specific performance.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
It is Appellee's position that Appellants raise no issues
to be decided by this Court and, consequently, the judgment of the
lower Court should be affirmed.

The Brief of Appellants is so

muddled and flawed that Appellee will not attempt to interpret the
issues raised by it. Rather, the issues which Appellee addresses
are as follows:
1.

Appellants' failure to provide a record transcript of

all evidence relevant to their contested Findings of Fact or

Conclusions of Law requires the presumption that the verdict was
supported

by admissible

and competent

evidence.

Sampson v.

Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) cert, denied, 776 P.2d
916 (Utah 1989). Accord Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763 (Utah 1985)
and Bevan v. J.H. Construction Co., 669 P.2d 442 (Utah 1983).
2.

Appellants' failure to demonstrate that marshalled

evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court is
legally insufficient to support the findings of fact requires the
decision of the lower court to be affirmed. Turnbauah v. Anderson,
793 P.2d 939 (Utah Ct.App. 1990).
3.

Unless Appellants can show that the trial court's

Findings of Fact are clearly erroneous, the appellate court must
not disturb the trial court's findings.

State v. Martinez, 811

P.2d 205 (Utah Ct.App. 1991).
4. The trial court correctly applied the proper measure of
damages for a breach of contract. Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692
(Utah 1982), Young Electric Sign Company v. United Standard West,
755 P.2d 162 (Utah 1988), and Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Company,
455 P.2d 197 (Utah 1969).
5. Appellants' claims of constitutional rights violations
were not raised at the trial court, or anywhere for that matter,
and, therefore, cannot be raised on appeal.

Crookston v. Fire

Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).

Accord, Johnson v.

Department of Employment Security, 782 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct.App. 1989)
and Pratt v. City Council of City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172 (Utah
1981).
2

6. Appellants' acceptance of the benefits of the judgment
estops Appellants from attacking the judgment on appeal. Cingolni
v. Utah Power & Light Co., 790 P.2d 1219 (Utah Ct.App. 1990).
7.

Appellants' brief fails to comply with Rule 24 of the

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and their appeal should be
dismissed.
8.

State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct.App. 1992).
Appellants are not entitled to an award of attorney's

fees.
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable rule which disposes of Appellants' Appeal is
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

A copy of the

Rule is included as Exhibit A in the Addendum to Appellee's brief.
Also,

Section

78-27-56.5, Utah

Code Ann.,

(1953) as

amended, disposes of the Appellants' claim for attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 17, 1991, Appellants filed their Complaint in
the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County claiming a
breach of contract.

Appellee answered the Complaint asserting

various defenses, including impossibility of performance of the
contract.
The case was tried to the bench with the Honorable Jon M.
Memmott presiding on October 28th and October 29th, 1992.

The

Court issued a Memorandum Decision on December 4, 1992, declaring
that Defendant/Appellee had not met its burden in establishing the
defense

of

impossibility

of

contract

and

awarded

to

Plaintiff/Appellant judgment in the amount of $4,165.03, together
3

with a Decree of Specific Performance requiring Defendant/Appellee
to build a flood control channel and install field drains and a
barbed wire fence.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

reflecting the Memorandum Decision were signed by the lower Court
on January 20, 1993. Thereafter, Appellants filed their Notice of
Appeal on February 16, 1993.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Under the heading "Statement of Facts" Appellants have
rambled on about the history of farming in Davis County but none of
the information identified as facts was presented to the lower
court.

Except for the Memorandum Decision of the court and the

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered by the
courtf nothing in Appellants' addenda was introduced at trial.
Nothing in Appellants' brief refers to the original record or any
reporter's transcript as required by Subparagraph (e) of Rule 24 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Appellee's Statement of Facts is as follows:
1. Plaintiffs/Appellants through their attorney Richard W.
Jones filed a Complaint in the District Court of Davis County
asserting a breach of contract.
2.

(TR. 1-2).

Attached to the Complaint was a copy of the agreement

between Appellants and Appellee dated December 30, 1987, wherein
Davis County agreed to install by December 1988 a flood control
channel on property which it had purchased from Appellants.

(TR.

4-7).
3.

On September 10, 1991, Steven E. Clyde, Appellants'
4

second attorney, made an Entry of Appearance in the matter.

(TR.

51).
4. Steven E. Clyde filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel
dated January 9, 1992.
5.

(TR. 54).

Appellants' third attorney, Scott W. Holt, and the

attorney who represented Appellants through trial, made an Entry of
Appearance on April 10, 1992.
6.
carry

At trial, the court found that Appellee had failed to

its

burden

performance.
7.

(TR. 59).

of

proof

to

establish

impossibility

of

(TR. 78-90).
The court found that in order to make Appellants'

ground productive it would be necessary for them to install
interceptor drains on the east side of their property and rip the
hard pan on their property.
8.

(TR. 91)

The court found that the Appellee by not cleaning the

current drains that Appellants had dug on the property conveyed to
Appellee caused limited damage to crop production in the amount of
10% of the production per year.
9.

(TR. 91).

Relying upon the expert testimony of Professor Lyman

Willardson of Utah State University, the court found that failure
to dig a deep drain of 11 feet deep would make very little
difference in the productivity of Appellants' soil.

The Court,

therefore, found that Appellants would not suffer damage in crop
production as a result of the County's failure to build the 11 foot
deep channel.
10.

(TR. 91).

The court found that Appellants' damage was equal to
5

$4,165.03.
11.

(TR. 92).
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order

were signed and entered by the court on January 21, 1993.

(TR.

159-167).
12.

Davis County issued its check made payable to Joseph

Charles and Bessy T. Jensen in the amount of $4,165.03 which check
was endorsed by Appellants and presented for payment on January 19,
1993.

(Exhibit B of the Addendum).
13.

Scott W. Holt filed with the District Court a

Withdrawal of Counsel dated January 14, 1993.

(TR. 158).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Appellants have failed to provide a record transcript

of all evidence relevant to any contested Findings of Fact or
Conclusions of Law, so that a presumption exists that the verdict
was supported by admissible and competent evidence.
2.

Appellants have failed to marshall the evidence and

demonstrate through the evidence that the trial court's Findings of
Fact are legally insufficient.
3.

Unless the Appellants can show that the trial court's

Findings of Fact are clearly erroneous, the Appellate Court must
not disturb them.
4. The trial court correctly applied the proper measure of
damages for a breach of contract.
5. Appellants' claims of constitutional rights violations
were not raised at the trial court or anywhere and, therefore,
cannot be raised on appeal.
6

6. Appellants' acceptance of the benefits of the judgment
estops Appellants from attacking the judgment on appeal.
7.

Appellants are not entitled to attorney's fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

APPELLANTS' FAILURE TO PROVIDE A RECORD TRANSCRIPT
OF ALL EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO ANY CONTESTED FINDINGS
OF FACT OR CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REQUIRE THE
PRESUMPTION THAT THE VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY
ADMISSIBLE AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
After

two

full days

of

trial where

numerous

expert

witnesses were examined and cross-examined, and exhibits were
introduced, the court made Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
entered a judgment in favor of Appellants.

A significant record

was developed in the court below, yet Appellants have transcribed
only the testimony of Sidney W. Smith, the Public Works Director of
Davis County.
Appellants' brief makes only unintelligible references to
the transcript or the record. Additionally, Appellants attempt to
present to the court in their addenda hearsay evidence which was
never presented in the trial court below and has nothing to do with
the breach of contract claim asserted by Appellants in the lower
court. The record in the trial court, therefore, becomes essential
to understanding the facts presented to the judge which allowed him
to make the ruling which he made.

So important is the complete

record that the court in Smith v. Vuicich, 669 P.2d 763 (Utah
1985), declared:
Where the record before us is incomplete, we are
unable to review the evidence as a whole and must,
7

therefore, presume that the verdict was supported
by admissible and competent evidence.
At page 765.
(See also Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct.App. 1989)
cert denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989).
The court noted in Sampson that Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure requires Appellants to provide the
court with all evidence relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
At page 1002 the court said:
Accordingly, because the entire record in this
case in not before this court, we presume the
trial court's findings are supported by competent
and sufficient evidence...
The court went on to observe in Sampson that the findings
must clearly indicate the mind of the court and resolve all issues
of material fact necessary to justify the conclusions of law and
the judgment entered.

Without question, the Findings of Fact

(Exhibit C) clearly indicate the mind of the court.

The attention

of the court is invited to paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact
where the judge acknowledges conflicting testimony from experts and
indicates that he bases his findings upon the credibility and
weight

of

the

testimony

specifically determined

of

the

experts.

The

court

then

that the damage caused by Appellee's

failure to clean the present storm drain was limited to 10% of the
crop production per year.

After hearing the evidence, the court

specifically found that Appellants would not suffer damage from
failure to dig the storm drain 11 feet deep.

It is apparent from

the findings of the court that the court was persuaded Appellants'
8

lack of crop production was substantially impacted by their failure
to dig an interceptor drain on the northeast side of their property
and to rip the hard pan on their property.

The court found that

$4,165.03 was the amount of damage which resulted because Appellee
Davis County failed to clean the present ditch.

The Findings of

Fact are clear and the inescapable conclusion is the court must
affirm the lower court decision.
POINT II
APPELLANTS' FAILURE TO DEMONSTRATE THROUGH THE
MARSHALLING OF EVIDENCE THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDINGS WERE LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT REQUIRES THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT TO BE AFFIRMED.
A compelling reason why the Appellate Rules require a full
transcript of the relevant evidence is noted in Doelle v. Bradley,
784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989):
To successfully attack the Findings of Fact, an
appellant must first marshall all the evidence
supporting the findings and then demonstrate that
even if viewed in the light most favorable to the
trial court, the evidence is legally insufficient
to support the findings.
At page 1178.
Appellants are, therefore, required to marshall the evidence to
demonstrate that the trial court's findings were insufficient.
There is no recognizable marshalling of the evidence in Appellants'
brief.
Citing Doelle with approval, the court in Turnbaugh v.
Anderson, 793 P.2d 939 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) said,
Findings of fact "should not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.

At page 941.
The clearly erroneous standard of Turnbaugh was also applied in
State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205 (Utah App.Ct. 1991).
There is nothing in Appellants' brief or in the limited
transcript of the record which even remotely rises to the level of
"clearly erroneous."

The trial court weighed the conflicting

evidence and entered a judgment in Appellants' favor.

It is

apparent that Appellants are angry with the Army Corps of Engineers
(not even a party) and Davis County and are not pleased with the
ruling of the trial judge.

Their brief is simply an attempt to

retry the case to the Appellate Court using evidence that was not
even

introduced

in

the

trial

court

rather

than

point

out

deficiencies in the facts upon which the trial court made its
ruling.

Such cannot be and this court must affirm the trial court

below.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE PROPER
MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR A BREACH OF CONTRACT.
It has long been established in Utah that the proper
measure of damages for a breach of contract is to award an amount
which is necessary to place the non-breaching party in as good a
position as if the contract had been performed.
Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982).

Alexander v.

The court in Young Electric

Sign Company v. United Standard West, 755 P.2d 162 (Utah 1988),
relied upon Alexander and said,
In general, contractual damages are measured by
the lost benefit of the bargain...
10

At page 164.
In Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Company, 455 P.2d 197 (Utah 1969 U
In Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Company, 455 P.2d 197 (Utah 1969),
the court instructed that when the claim is based upon a definite
contract the appropriate assessment of damages is:
...that a non-beaching party should receive an
award which will put him in as good a position as
he would have been had there been no breach.
At page 198.
In applying the law to the facts the trial court in this
case determined that Appellee breached the contract when it failed
to construct an 11 foot deep channel.

However, the court also

found that a 6 foot deep channel would have drained Appellants'
property sufficiently to allow it to yield the same crop that it
would have if an 11 foot deep ditch had been dug. The 6 foot deep
ditch already in existence would have been cleaned if Appellee had
performed under the contract.

Because the existing ditch was not

cleaned, Appellee caused some limited damage to Appellants' crop
production which the court specifically found was 10% of the
production per year for three and one half years.

Therefore, if

Appellee had fully performed under the contract, Appellants would
have received $4,165.03 in increased income from crop production.
Consequently, the damages awarded to Appellants places them in the
same position they would have been in if Appellee had fully
performed under the contract. The trial court's application of the
law to the facts is consistent with the standard set by the Supreme
Court and should be upheld on appeal.
11

POINT IV
APPELLANTS' CLAIMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS WERE NOT RAISED AT THE TRIAL COURT OR
ANYWHERE AND, THEREFORE, CANNOT BE RAISED ON
APPEAL.
The Complaint of Appellants filed by their first attorney
and not modified by any of their subsequent attorneys asserted a
breach of contract claim.

The record is entirely devoid of any

assertion that Appellants' constitutional rights were violated.
Not before the trial court or anywhere else have Appellants raised
constitutional issues until Appellants in their brief assert a
constitutional taking of their property. Had Appellants raised the
issue below, it would have been challenged

because Appellee

believed it paid Appellants fair market value for their property.
However, it has long been recognized that issues not raised at
trial cannot be raised on appeal.
In Pratt v. City Council of the City of Riverton, 639 P.2d
172 (1981), the court squarely addressed the issue. Responding to
a constitutional claim for the first time on appeal the court said,
Issues not raised at trial cannot be raised on
appeal.
This general rule applies equally to
constitutional issues, with the limited exception
of where a person's liberty is at stake. Inasmuch
as the constitutionality of the act was never
raised at trial, plaintiffs are, therefore,
precluded from raising it on appeal.
At page 173-174.
In Johnson v. Department of Employment Security, 782 P.2d
965 (Utah Ct.App. 1989), the court declined to address the issue of
violation of constitutional guarantees of equal protection when
Johnson raised the issue for the first time on appeal.
12

The court

instructed,
...We do not consider issues raised for the first
time on appeal. Rekward v. Industrial Commission,
755 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).
This
general rule applies to constitutional issues
first raised on appeal as well as to other issues,
unless a person's liberty is at stake. Pratt v.
City Council of the City of Riverton, 639 P.2d
172, 173-174 (Utah 1981); see Pease v. Industrial
Commission, 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984)
(petitioner has the responsibility to raise all
issues that could be presented at the time,
including constitutional issues, for the issues to
K
~ presented for appeal).
972.
Crookston
Insurance Exchange,

* . * - . • t>

< <

v. Fire

where the claim was

that an awa rd of compensatory punitive damages v.i n I atpnj
i

process provisions

Constitution,

of

n

the Utah

However, the claims were first argued on appeal.

The Supreme Court declared,
Fire insurance did not, however, raise these
arguments before the trial court and has,
therefore, waived any right to present them on
appeal,.,.
At page 800.
Simply stated, AppeJ Lants cannot,. imw ra.iwe ciiiiins ot constituti onal
depravati on for the fi rst time on appeal.
POINT V
APPELLANTS ACCEPTANCE OF THE BENEFITS OF THE
JUDGMENT ESTOPS APPELLANTS FROM ATTACKING THE
JUDGMENT ON APPEAL.
Included as

addendum -

c
r

.

:
ensen

amount

ant<=i Joseph Charles

$4,165 •• - which
u

Bessy

s the same amount as

the judgment rendered by the court.
presented

The check was endorsed and

for payment on January 19, 1993.

Appellants have,

therefore, accepted the benefits of the judgment while at the same
time they are pursuing the appeal before this court.

In Cinaolani

v. Utah Power and Light Company, 790 P.2d 1219 (Utah Ct.App. 1990),
the court described the doctrine of acceptance of the benefits as
follows:
Under the general
acceptance-of-the-benefits
doctrine, one who accepts a benefit under a
judgment is estopped from later attacking the
judgment on appeal, and one who acquiesces in the
judgment cannot later attack. Tree v. Lewis. 738
P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987);...
At page 1221.
It is, therefore, clear that Appellants have accepted the benefit
of the judgment and are estopped from attacking the judgment on
appeal.
POINT VI
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Appellants seem to claim in their brief that the court
erred by not awarding them attorney's fees.

The trial court

addressed the issue in its Conclusions of Law as follows:
Because the contract has no provision which allows
at least one party to recover attorney's fees as
required in Section 78-27-56.5 and because the
court finds the defense was with merit and brought
in good faith, the court does not award any costs
or attorney's fees.
Section 78-27-56.5, Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended, which
was referenced by the court states the following:
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to
either party that prevails in a civil action based
14

upon any promissory note, written contract, or
other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when
the provisions of the promissory note, written
contract, or other writing allowed at least one
party to recover attorney's fees.
.,
signed on December 30, 1987.
attorney's fees

. -

im

was

The contract has no provision about

Phe statute, therefore, precludes the court from
fees to el ther party.

The statutory provision is consistent with prior Utah case
law.

In Caur

v. Enoch

Smith Co . , 781

!» 2d

I •>')•' (llf.«.ih i '1. „ App.

] 989 | , Mio court sa i.d,
We do, however, find error in awarding attorney's
fees in favor of Smith. "The general rule in Utah
is that attorney fees cannot be recovered absent
statutory authorization or contract."
Cooper v.
Deseret Federal Savings and Loan Association, 757
P.2d 483, 486 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).
See also
Mecham
v.
Benson,
590
P.2d
304, 309
(Utah
1979)
.
At page 129fi.
There i s no [u ovi si on i ii I. he con I i »M "I" betwiien the pdi.'l.ies
for an award of attorney's fees, therefor? -, the ruling of the trial
court about attorney's fees is proper < nu should be affirmed.
CONCLUSIONS
The
foregoing

Appellee

this

court

respectfully
most

dismiss

submits
the

that

appeal

based
and

upon

the

affirm

the

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3^o

day of

/hi^xA^h

1993.

21.

Gera ld-ls. Hes s
Chief Civil Deputy
Davis County Attorney's Office
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT

- Rule 24 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

EXHIBIT

- Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

EXHIBI1

*|W>
Any party may file a response in opposition to a
motion within 10 days after service of the motion;
however, the court may, for good cause shown, disRule 22. Computation and enlargement of time. pense with, shorten or extend the time for responding
(a) Computation of time. In computing any pe- to any motion.
riod of time prescribed by these rules, by an order of
(b) Determination of motions for procedural
the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the orders. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph
act, event, or default from which the designated pe- (a) of this rule as to motions generally, motions for
riod of time begins to run shall not be included. The procedural orders which do not substantially affect
last day of the period shall be included, unless it is a the rights of the parties or the ultimate disposition of
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which the appeal, including any motion under Rule 22(b),
event the period extends until the end of the next day may be acted upon at any time, without awaiting a
that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. response. Pursuant to rule or order of the court, moWhen the period of time prescribed or allowed is less tions for specified types of procedural orders may be
than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, disposed of by the clerk. The court may review a disand legal holidays shall be excluded in the computa- position by the clerk upon motion of a party or upon
tion. As used in this rule, "legal holiday" includes its own motion.
(Jays designated as holidays by the state or federal
(c) Power of a single justice or judge to entergovernments.
tain motions. In addition to the authority expressly
(b) Enlargement of time. The court for good cause conferred by these rules or by law, a single justice or
shown may upon motion enlarge the time prescribed judge of the court may entertain and may grant or
by these rules or by its order for doing any act, or may deny any request for relief which under these rules
permit an act to be done after the expiration of such may properly be sought by motion, except that a sintime, but the court may not enlarge the time for filing gle justice or judge may not dismiss or otherwise dea notice of appeal or a petition for review from an termine an appeal or other proceeding, and except
order of an administrative agency, except as specifi- that the court may provide by order or rule that any
cally authorized by law. A motion for an enlargement motion or class of motions must be acted upon by the
of time shall be filed prior to the expiration of the court. The action of a single justice or judge may be
time for which the enlargement is sought. A motion reviewed by the court.
(d) Form of papers; number of copies.
for enlargement of time shall:
(1) Except for motions to enlarge time, five
(1) State with particularity the reasons for
copies shall be filed with the original in the Sugranting the motion;
preme Court, and four copies shall be filed with
(2) State whether the movant has previously
the original in the Court of Appeals, but the
been granted an enlargement of time and, if so,
court may require that additional copies be furthe number and duration of such enlargements;
nished. Only the original of a motion to enlarge
(3) State when the time will expire for doing
time
shall be filed.
the act for which the enlargement of time is
(2) Motions and other papers shall be typesought; and
written on opaque, unglazed paper 8V2 by 11
(4) State the date on which the act for which
inches in size. The text shall be in type not
the enlargement of time is sought will be comsmaller than ten characters per inch. Lines of
pleted.
text shall be double spaced and shall be upon one
(c) Ex parte motion. Except as to enlargements of
side
of the paper only. Consecutive sheets shall
time for filing and service of briefs under Rule 26(a),
be attached at the upper left margin.
a party may file one ex parte motion for enlargement
(3) A motion or other paper shall contain a
of time not to exceed 14 days if no enlargement of
caption setting forth the name of the court, the
time has been previously granted, if the time has not
title of the case, the docket number, and a brief
already expired for doing the act for which the endescriptive title indicating the purpose of the palargement is sought, and if the motion otherwise comper. The attorney shall sign all papers filed with
plies with the requirements and limitations of parathe court with his or her individual name. The
graph (b) of this rule.
attorney shall give his or her business address,
(d) Additional time after service by mail.
telephone number, and Utah State Bar number
Whenever a party is required or permitted to do an
in the upper left hand corner of the first page of
act within a prescribed period after service of a paper
every paper filed with the court except briefs A
and the paper is served by mail, 3 days shall be added
party who is not represented by an attorney shall
to the prescribed period.
sign any paper filed with the court and state the
party's address and telephone number.
Rule 23. Motions.
(a) Content of motion; response; reply. Unless Rule 24. Briefs.
another form is elsewhere prescribed by these rules,
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appelan application for an order or other relief shall be lant shall contain under appropriate headings and in
made by filing a motion for such order or relief with the order indicated:
proof of service on all other parties. The motion shall
( D A complete list of all parties to the proceedcontain or be accompanied by the following:
ing in the court or agency whose judgment or
( D A specific and clear statement of the relief
order is sought to be reviewed, except where the
sought;
caption of the case on appeal contains the names
(2) A particular statement of the factual
of all such parties. The list should be set out on a
grounds;
separate page which appears immediately inside
(3) If the motion is for other than an enlargethe cover.
ment of time, a memorandum of points and au(2) A table of contents, with page references.
thorities in support; and
(3) A table of authonties with cases alphabeti(4) Affidavits and papers, where appropriate.
cally arranged and with parallel citations, rules,
wjunsel of record or by a part) who IK not represented
jy counsel.

Rule 25

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are
cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction
of the appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and the standard of appellate review for
each issue with supporting authority for each issue.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative shall be set out verbatim
with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent
part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone
will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall
be set forth as provided in paragraph (f) of this
rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement
shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case,
the course of proceedings, and its disposition in
the court below. A statement of the facts relevant
to the issues presented for review shall follow.
All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to
the record (see paragraph (e)).
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of
arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a
mere repetition of the heading under which the
argument is arranged.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented, with citations to
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
relied on.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
_
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee
shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of
this rule, except that a statement of the issues or of
the case need not be made unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in
reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee
has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues
presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be
limited to answering any new matter set forth in the
opposing brief. No further briefs may be filed except
with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will
be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep
to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee". It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or
in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of
parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee,"
"the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original record
as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb), to pages of the
reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of
the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to
exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is
made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the
transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected
(f) Reproduction of opinions, statutes, rules,
regulations, documents, etc.
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(1) Any opinion, memorandum of decision^
findings of fact, conclusions of law, or order per*
taining to the issues on appeal and any jury ia,
structions or other part of the record of central
importance to the determination of the appeal
shall be reproduced in the brief or in an addendum to the brief.
,*
(2) If determination of the issues presented re*
quires the study of statutes, rules, regulations,
etc., or relevant parts thereof, to the extent not
set forth under subparagraph (a)(6) of this rule,
they shall be reproduced in the brief or in an
addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to.
the court in pamphlet form.
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the
court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and
reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules,
regulations, or portions of the record as required by
paragraph (f) of this rule.
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a
cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of
appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes
of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise
agree or the court otherwise orders. The brief of the
appellee shall contain the issues and arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to
the brief of the appellant.
*
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one
appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join
in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may
adopt by reference any part of the brief of another.
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When
pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a
party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate
court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be
filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the
letter shall without argument state the reasons for
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be
made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly
limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or
scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of
heavy cover stock and shall comply with Rule 27.
Rule 25. Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian
ad litem.
A brief of an amicus curiae or of a guardian ad
litem representing a minor who is not a party to the
appeal may be filed only if accompanied by written
consent of all parties, or by leave of court granted on
motion or at the request of the court. A motion for
leave shall identify the interest of the applicant and
shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus
curiae or the guardian ad litem is desirable. Except
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DAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY

IN THE SECOND JUDIcflAT^^ISTRICt^COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH CHARLES JENSEN and BESSY T.
JENSEN
Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)

DAVIS COUNTY,

)

Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

)

Civil No. 9107 49203 CV

)

THIS MATTER having come on regularly for Trial on the 28th and 29th
day of October, 1992 before the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, one of the Judges of
the above entitled Court, Plaintiff was present and represented by SCOTT W.
HOLT and Defendants were represented by Counsel GERALD HESS.
THE COURT, after
witnesses

and

the

presented

and

legal

having heard testimony

arguments

of

Counsel,

memorandums

filed

after

and

of the parties and the
review

being

of

further

the

evidence

advised,

does

hereby makes the following Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties entered

a contract

under

which

Plaintiff

sold a

portion of his farm ground to Davis County for the construction of a flood
control channel.

The pertinent parts of the contract provided:

A.

The flood control channel was to be 11 feet deep; and

B.

The flood control channel was to be completed on or before

December, 1988.
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JUDGMENT ENTERED
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FILMED

2.

At the time the contract was entered that it was not foreseeable

that Plaintiffs' property would be subject to "Wetlands Act."
contract,

Plaintiff

indicated

that

indication

and the project director

at the

that

the

time of
Plaintiffs'

the

Both parties to the

for the County,

contract

irrigated

they

had

farmland

no

Mr. Sid
idea

would

or

be

Smith,
previous

considered

wetlands.
3.

The fact that an environmental expert, Mr. Oliver Graw, testified

at Trial

that from looking at a 1987 or

1988 photograph of the

property

that certain areas could be potential

that the issue of "wetlands" was foreseeable

Plaintiffs'

"wetlands" does not

establish

by the parties at the time of

contract.
4.

That Plaintiff negotiated for the sale of his land based upon the

construction of the 11 foot deep drainage channel.

The Plaintiff sold his land

at a lower price than he believed was the fair market value.
the

flood

Plaintiffs'

control
land

channel

substantially

would

act as a field

by leaching

problem.

He believed crop production

Plaintiffs'

extensive

research,

prior

drain

Plaintiff believed

which

would

the ground and removing
would

double.

experience

with

benefit

an alkali

This was based on
field

drains,

other

properties in the area and discussions with Utah State University Professors.
5.

That Davis County did not complete the

11 foot

flood

control

channel on or before December 1988 as required by the Contract.
6.

That the Court found two separate reasons why Davis County did

not complete the 11 foot flood control channel on or before December 1988 as
required by the Contract and have not presently completed the project.
A.

In

the

summer

of

1988

the

Davis

County

Commission

directed Mr. Sid Smith that all the equipment and personnel of Davis County be
assigned

to the completion of the fill

project

for construction of the Davis
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County Jail and Court Complex.
anticipated
complete

and
the

Commission

as

a result

flood

control

and Mr. Smith

This project turned out to be larger than

there

were

channel

no

as

County

originally

resources

available

planned.

The

to

County

were aware that the contract with the Plaintiff

could not be completed if personnel and resources were diverted to the other
project.

Despite

the contract

agreement

assign resources to another project.

the County

knowingly

decided

to

Thus, the Court finds upon the facts that

the County breached the terms of the contract by not completing the project
on or before
defense

of

December

1988, for a reason separate than set forth in their

impossibility.

The

Court

finds

that

the

decision

to

transfer

resources was prior to any knowledge of "wetland" issues, and that the County
could not have completed the project on or before December 1988 because of
the decision to transfer the resources.
B.

Following

the

decision

to

divert

the

equipment

and

resources from the flood control channel project to the Jail Complex project
the

County

learned

in November of

1988 that there were

being raised on the related flood control project in Clinton.

"wetland" issues
Following this

discovery the County had several meetings and correspondence with the Army
Corps

of Engineers concerning

the property

involved

in this lawsuit.

The

pertinent information the County received was as follows:
i.

April 10, 1989 - Letter from Army Corps of Engineers

to Sid Smith, Davis County Flood Control.

This letter established that the County

must obtain a 404 permit before they could proceed any further with the flood
control

channel.
ii.

to Mr. Sid Smith.

June 23, 1989 - Letter from Army Corps of Engineers

This letter established the notice to the County that the Army

Corps of Engineers considered thai the proposed 11 foot channel would drain
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adjacent wetlands.

As such, this was not the "less damaging alternative" as

required

the

to

obtain

required

permit.

The

Army

Corps

of

Engineers

recommended consideration of a wider canal only two to three feet deep.
iii.

October

Engineers to Mr. Sid Smith.

6,

1989

-

Letter

from

Army

Corps

of

This letter established again that the 11 foot deep

channel as required under the contract was not acceptable to the Army Corps
of Engineers.

The letter also established that the permit application from the

County was not complete and if the County provided a study the Corps would
consider

less

damaging

alternatives.

iv.
Engineers.

January

26,

1990

- Letter

from

Army

Corps

of

This letter responded to several issues raised by the Plaintiff in

which he indicated that the lands were not subject to the Wetlands Act and the
County should therefore proceed on the project without a permit.
7.

Based upon testimony
and

Davis

County

of the witnesses
meetings

the

and minutes of various

Syracuse

City

Court

found

that the

facts

establish

that in addition to the problem with the 404 permits and wetland

issue the County had difficulties with Syracuse City in obtaining approval for
the flood control project as designed.
sufficient

As a result the County did not have

funds to complete the closed pipe option approved by Syracuse.

Court specifically

The

finds that it was a combination of the "wetlands" issues and

permits, the lack of approval from Syracuse City and lack of adequate funding
to complete the project that caused the County to not proceed to finish the
project or proceed to begin the necessary studies to get permit approval for
"less damaging alternatives."
determine
application
channel.

which
(for

The Court is not able, based upon the evidence, to

was the primary
any

alternative)

factor for not proceeding
and

construction

of

the

with the permit
flood

control

The Court does find that each issue was a significant factor in not

00170973

proceeding with the permit application and project.
8.

In

1992 Syracuse

City

obtained

Community

which are being applied to this flood control project.

block

grant

funds

With these additional

funds and approval of Syracuse City, the County has retained consultants from
Ekitone to complete the necessary environmental studies in order to submit a
complete 404 application to receive the permit in order to complete the flood
control

channel.
9.

The County is now developing "less damaging alternative plans"

for the flood control channel.
received

notice

of

an

This is approximately 3-1/2 years after they

incomplete

application

from

the

Army

Corps

of

Engineers.
10.
constructed

As to damages that have resulted because the County has not
the

11

conflicting testimony

foot

deep

flood

from the Plaintiff,

control

channel

the

Court

Mr. Jensen, Plaintiffs

received

expert - Prof.

Gilbert Miller, PHD., and Defendant's expert - Prof. Lyman Willardson, PHD.
Based upon the credibility and weight of the testimony the Court makes the
following findings relating to the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs.
A.

That the Plaintiffs farm land is in an area with significant

ground water, alkali and hard pan problems.
B.

That only

by developing

and riping the hard pan would the Plaintiff
beyond

current
C

an extensive

field

drain system

be able to increase

production

levels.
That the County

by not cleaning

the current drains that

Plaintiffs had dug on the land he conveyed that the County caused some limited
damage

to crop

production

production.

The Court

finds that damage

to be

10% of

per year.
D.

That as established by Prof. Lyman Willardson a deep drain
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on the west side of the property would have very little impact for two reasons:
(1)

The ground water comes from the Northeast and therefore an interceptor

drain is needed on the Northeast side of the property rather than the West; and
(2)

Below a depth of six feet on Plaintiffs' property is clay soil which does not

allow for permeability.

Therefore, there would be very little difference in

productivity between an 11 foot channel or a six foot channel.
E

The Court finds

therefore, that the Plaintiff

would not

suffer damage in crop production for failure of the County in building an 11
foot deep channel if they build as a "less damaging alternative" a five to six
foot flood control channel.
F.
failure

to clean

The Court finds the damage to Plaintiff
the current

drains

and proceed

to build

for
"less

Defendants'
damaging

alternative drains" at 5'-6' for the last 3-1/2 years is:
1989 - 4.5 bushels (10% of production) x 123 acres x $2.21 =
$ 1,223.24
1990 - 3.78 bushels (10% of production) x 123 acres x $2.16 =
$ 1,004.27
1991 - No damage - crop lost
1992 - 6.97 bushels (10% of production) x 123 acres x $2.26 =
$ 1.937.52
TOTAL:

$4,165.03
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In this case, the Court finds that in order for the Defendant to establish
the contractual defense of impossibility and for the obligation to be deemed
discharged,

they

must

establish

(1)

an

unforseen

event

occurring

after

formation of the contract, (2) that they are without fault in relation to the
Plaintiff

under the contract; and (3) the unforseen event makes performance
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of the contract impossible or highly

impracticable.

In the facts established at trial:
1.

The

requirement

of

a

404

permit

was

an

unforseen

event

occurring after the formation of the contract.
2.

The Defendants are not without fault in relation to the contract.

The Defendants

breached the contract for other reasons prior to learning of

the 404 permit requirement.

The Defendants did not clean and maintain the

drain

acquired

on

the

property

they

while

this

dispute

continued.

The

Defendants did not proceed to complete the permit application because of other
reasons, in addition, to the normal 404 permit process.

Defendants' own expert

said a six foot drain would benefit Plaintiff as much as an 11 foot drain, but
they did not proceed for 3-1/2 years on that permit process.
3.

The performance of the 11 foot drain is highly impracticable or

impossible if there is a less damaging alternative.

However, the performance

of a permit for a six foot channel or providing other drains on the Northeast of
the

property

or

other

reasonable

alternatives

were

not

pursued

by

the

Defendant because of other problems with the project with Syracuse City.
Because of these findings the Court concludes that the Defendant has
not met its burden in establishing the defense of impossibility.
The Court would, therefore, grant Plaintiff specific performance

limited

to the County proceeding to build the flood control channel utilizing a "less
damaging alternative" of five to six foot depth if approved by the Army Corps
of Engineers.
installation

The Court would grant Plaintiff specific performance as to the

of three field drains and the barbed wire fence

along the west

boundary of the property after the construction is completed.
Because the contract has no provision which allows at least one party to
recover attorney's fees as required in Section 78-27-56.5 and because the Court

finds the defense was with merit and brought in good faith the Court does not
award any costs or attorney's fees.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the
Court

hereby
ORDERS:
1.

That Plaintiff be awarded damages in the amount of $4,165.03.

2.

That

County

proceeding

Plaintiff
to

be

build

awarded
the

flood

specific

performance

control

channel

limited

utilizing

to
a

the
"less

damaging alternative" of five to six foot depth if approved by the Army Corps
of

Engineers.
3.

That

Plaintiff

installation of three field

be

awarded

specific

performance

drains and the barbed wire fence

as

to

the

along the west

boundary of the property after the construction is completed.
4.
costs

Each party should assume and pay their own attorney's fees and

incurred

herein.

DATED this <^C> day of January, 1993.

JiJtJe.

JON M. MEMMOTT
District Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

GERALB-flESS, AnorneWbr Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER was mailed to the Attorney for
Defendant, GERALD HESS, at the Davis County Attorney's Office, at P 0 Box 769,
Farmington, Utah

84025 this _j£_

day of January, 1993 by depositing same iin

the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY AND MAILING

I hereby certify that I delivered an original and ten true
and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief to:
The Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City UT 84102
and two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief
to:
Joseph C. Jensen
Attorney Pro Se for Appellants
P.O. Box 73
Clearfield UT 84015
postage prepaid this j5^fc>

day of

PfH^u^

Gefrald^E. Hess
jensen2.bri

18

/ 1993.
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